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ATHEISM AND THE EFFECTS OF MORTALITY SALIENCE AND LIMITED
ANALYTIC PROCESSING ABILITY ON RELIGIOUS FAITH
BRETT WAGGONER
ABSTRACT
The scenario of the atheist in the proverbial foxhole has been a topic of discussion
in religious circles for centuries. Building on prior research utilizing terror management
theory (TMT), a dual process model of cognition, and previous work suggesting that
humans are intuitively wired for teleological and religious concepts, the researchers set
out to examine atheist’s religiosity when confronted with the reality of one’s
impermanence. To explore this idea, the present experiment recruited a sample of
atheists, manipulated their awareness of mortality, manipulated their ability to employ
analytic thinking, and measured various intuitive cognitions (e.g., teleological reasoning)
alongside religious belief. Results suggest that atheists in the speeded conditions reported
higher agreement with teleological items; but the same did not happen for religious items.
Additionally, atheists primed with mortality salience (vs. control) reported lower
agreement with religious items in the un-speeded condition, but not in the speeded
condition; a similar interaction was not observed for the teleology items. Limitations and
potential directions for future research are discussed.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In his classic novel The Stranger, French novelist Albert Camus (1942) tells the
story of Meursault, a man who views life as completely meaningless, with death being
the only ultimate destination, and with no God to save him from his unavoidable doom.
While Meursault is in prison awaiting a death sentence, he is visited by the prison
chaplain, who tries to convince Meursault that there is a God and that he should repent.
Yet, even as the guillotine awaits him, the atheistic Meursault contemplates the nature of
existence and comes to the conclusion that God is of no importance and that faith would
be a waste of what little time he has left. Despite the chaplain’s repeated attempts,
Meursault remains steadfast in rejecting the faith that promises to save him from his
impending doom.
Meursault’s situation, as the atheist in the proverbial foxhole, has been a topic
explored by philosophers and writers for many years. But in the past few decades,
experimental psychology has begun to bring a scientific perspective to these profound
issues as well. One particularly relevant psychological perspective is that of terror
management theory (TMT; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986), which posits
that humans deal with the awareness of death by immersing themselves in socially
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established worldviews that imbue the world with significance and offer the possibility of
permanence. One type of cultural worldview that offers a strong sense of immortality is
religion, which offers literal immortality (e.g., the promise of an afterlife) to its followers.
However, atheists nevertheless choose to reject the supernatural claims of religion, and
thus do not reap the psychological benefits that religion has to offer for managing the
awareness of death. One of the explanations as to why atheists reject religion and other
teleological concepts may be that they engage in analytical thinking to over-ride these
otherwise cognitively intuitive beliefs (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012). However, no
previous research has tested this idea; that atheists maintain their disbelief, even under
death awareness, by cognitively over-riding the motivation to express religious faith. The
present thesis seeks to test this possibility.
TMT and Research
Humans are fundamentally social creatures that form groups and participate in
vast cultures that consist of shared beliefs, values, and customs that give structure,
meaning, and significance to the world around them. Humans invest in culture by
participating in social and religious rituals, attending and cheering at sports events,
participating in national ceremonies, or coming together for a common social cause, such
as education, healthcare, or even music appreciation. When looking at human cultures
from an evolutionary perspective one might wonder why humans are the only species to
form such complex systems, and furthermore what function culture serves for our
species. As humans developed a more advanced prefrontal cortex, they gained the ability
to engage in abstract reasoning and planning—the ability to mentally simulate objects
(including themselves) across time, and imagine the way that future events (hunts, crop
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harvests, social interactions) might unfold. However, due to this simulation, humans
eventually became aware of the inevitable fact that all forms of life, including
themselves, are impermanent. Although other animals are able to recognize immediate
threats of mortality such as the threat of a charging lion that could easily kill them, only
humans are consciously aware of the inevitability of death.
Such an awareness can potentially leave humans with a profound problem: one is
aware of impending mortality but has no way of avoiding such a threat. Thus, according
to TMT (Greenberg et al., 1986), in the absence of physical recourse, humans have
developed psychological ways of mitigating the problem, by developing and participating
in permanence-promising cultural systems. Cultural worldviews, shared sets of beliefs,
values, and customs, imbue the world with a sense of meaning, purpose, value, and
significance, and ultimately offer a set of social standards by which humans can qualify
for a death-denying sense of permanence. One form of this permanence is through a
legacy, a form of symbolic, non-supernatural (secular) immortality: the notion that one
continues to live on after death through one’s lifetime accomplishments, such as
contributions through patriotism, business acumen, creative projects such as art,
literature, and film, and progeny, just to name a few (Routledge, Arndt, 2008). A second
form of permanence promised by some cultures is supernatural (religious) immortality:
the notion that although one may physically die, one will continue to exist eternally via a
soul (Kesebir, 2011). This kind of immortality is almost exclusively provided by
religions, which outline concepts consistent with eternal life, such as spirits, gods, souls,
creation, afterlife, heavens, and so on. This latter form of immortality has a long history
and is an especially effective terror management system given that it directly addresses

3

the problem of death by suggesting that physical death is actually not the end (Becker,
1973).
A significant amount of research has gone into testing the claims of TMT. Much
of this work makes use of the mortality salience hypothesis (Rosenblatt, Greenberg,
Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989), which holds that: if faith in cultural worldviews
helps manage the awareness of death, then increasing mortality salience (MS) should
increase faith in one’s cultural worldviews. In such research studies, participants are first
randomly assigned to either a MS condition or a control topic condition (other similarly
negative, but not mortality-related, topics, e.g., pain, failure, loneliness, uncertainty), and
then are given an opportunity to express faith in their cultural worldviews. MS has been
primed numerous ways (Burke, Martens, & Faucher, 2010), from simply asking
participants to write about the thoughts that the awareness of their death arouses in them,
to subliminal priming of the word “DEATH”, to field studies with various proximity to
death-related stimuli such as cemeteries, funeral services, or even insurance logos or
news headlines (e.g., political issues such as terrorism, capital punishment, abortion, war,
violent crime, natural disasters, etc.). MS effects have been observed in hundreds of
studies, on worldview-relevant topics ranging from defense of one’s country and national
identity, attitudes toward animals, health risk evaluations, sports team affiliations,
physical aggression, attitudes toward women, self-complexity, academic test scores,
public policy issues, and so on (Burke et al., 2010).
For example, one study by Greenberg, Porteus, Simon, Pyszczynski, and Solomon
(1995) investigated the effects of MS on people’s performance on a creative problemsolving task in which the solution to the tasks involved desecrating revered cultural
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symbols (e.g., sifting sand from a jar of ink using an American flag, thus defacing the
flag). MS caused participants to take twice as long to complete the task when they
required the desecration of cultural symbols. Other studies have found that MS increases
self-esteem striving in participants (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, &
Schimel, 2004), which is consistent with the idea that self-esteem reflects a positive
evaluation of whether one is living up to the permanence-promising standards and values
of one’s culture and can therefore be considered a valuable member and contributor to
their culture.
TMT and Religion
From a TMT perspective, religion serves as a very effective way to manage death
awareness, given that it can provide both non-supernatural and supernatural immortality.
Regarding the former, religious believers can attain a non-supernatural legacy through
their religion by spreading the teachings and doctrines of their faith to their children and
other non-believers to perpetuate and increase the dominance and perceived veracity of
their religious views. However, the primary element that distinguishes religion from other
non-religious cultural beliefs is that religions offer supernatural permanence—concepts
(e.g., souls, spirits, gods, heaven) that provide literal permanence after one’s physical
death. This desire for permanence has featured in thousands of now-defunct religions and
mythologies and continues to be a fundamental feature in various contemporary world
religions, each supplying their own spiritual solution to the problem of human mortality
through their own theological doctrines.
Given the role that religion’s supernatural immortality can play in assuaging death
anxiety, several empirical studies have investigated mortality salience and religious
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belief. One study found that when Christian participants were reminded of mortality they
increased their defense of their worldview by increasing support for a Christian who
shared their worldview, but not for a Jewish person (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon,
Rosenblatt, Veeder, Kirkland, & Lyon 1990). Another study by Osarchuk and Tatz
(1973), found that MS caused believers to increase their faith in an afterlife. Furthermore,
numerous studies have investigated the effects of MS on belief in supernatural agents
(spirits, gods), which supply the theological foundation for spiritual existence, an
afterlife, and an immortal soul. One study by Norenzayan and Gervais (2006) found that
when religious participants were made aware of death, they increased belief in various
supernatural agents. Additionally, Vail, Arndt, & Abdollahi (2012) found that MS led
American Christians and Iranian Muslims to each increase general religiosity and faith in
a higher power; but, more specifically, MS also led Christians to increase faith in
God/Jesus and reject other religions’ agents (Allah, Buddha), and led Iranian Muslims to
increase belief in Allah and reject the agents of other religions (God/Jesus, Buddha).
Jong, Halberstadt, & Bluemke (2012) found similar findings, showing that MS led
Christians to increase general religiosity.
Other related research has provided evidence that affirming afterlife beliefs and
religious concepts can serve as a buffer to the awareness of death. One study (Dechesne,
Pyszczynski, Arndt, Ransom, Sheldon, Knippenberg, & Janssen, 2003) had participants
read a fake article ostensibly about Harvard medical research, reporting examinations of
over 600 out of body near death experiences, in which survivors reported floating above
their bodies and seeing deceased loved ones, and concluded this as evidence of an
afterlife. Other participants read a different article that offered the alternative conclusion
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that such an experience is the by-product of biological processes, such as oxygen
deprivation in the brain. MS produced the usual defensive responses among participants
in the afterlife-debunked group, but not in the afterlife-affirmation group, suggesting that
the affirmation of spiritual afterlife served as a buffer against mortality awareness and its
consequences. Another study (Jackson, Jong, Bluemke, Poulter, Morgenroth, &
Halberstadt, 2017) investigated the extent to which one’s religious views are capable of
psychologically shielding oneself from the anxiety of one’s death. They found that
believers reported higher death anxiety when their worldview was threatened, and that
religious belief alleviated believer’s implicit death anxiety.
Another study by Schimel, Hayes, Williams, and Jahrig (2007) showed that when
creationist participants were exposed to a scientific article challenging the validity of
creationism and arguing instead in favor of evolution, they reported increased death
thought accessibility (indicating that creationism was being effectively used to shield
against death thought) but not after reading an article on a neutral topic. Other research
investigating the buffering effects of religious beliefs found that MS can increase
participant’s belief in intelligent design (creationism) rather than evolutionary theory
(Tracey, Hart, & Martens, 2011). Given that religion provides an explanation of the
universe, existence, and individual lives as an intended phenomenon created for a
purpose, these teleological worldviews help to buffer the existential anxiety produced by
the insignificance of individual existence. These studies lend further support to the notion
that belief in supernatural agency and spiritual immortality serve a unique protection
from the awareness of mortality. Indeed, Davis, Juhl, & Routledge (2011) found that
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experimentally elevating teleological beliefs reduced death thought accessibility, while
mortality salience increased teleological beliefs, despite judgement errors.
These studies provide strong empirical support for the notion that religious
concepts serve a special terror management function given that they deny the
impermanence that is related to death. Rather, religion offers that the continuation of the
self is possible after death. However, despite the usefulness and effectiveness of these
religious buffers, there are a population of individuals that are reluctant to embrace these
beliefs, and others who even go so far as to outright reject them. Such people provide an
interesting demographic worth considering and studying, to further understand the
intricacies and exceptions behind the acceptance and rejection of religious beliefs and the
mechanics of terror management more broadly.
Atheism, TMT, and Analytic Thinking
Recent polls (Pew, 2015) show that the number of people in the world who
identify as non-religious is on the rise, with different categories of religious skepticism,
including spiritual but unaffiliated, agnostics, and atheists. The spiritual but unaffiliated
are individuals who apparently still accept supernatural concepts such as gods, souls, and
heaven, but choose not to identify with a particular organized religion, denomination, or
form of worship. Research has shown that up to 50% of those who report themselves as
unaffiliated still believe in supernatural concepts (Vernon 1969, Baker & Smith, 2009),
making them unlikely to abstain from expressing faith in supernatural concepts to
manage the awareness of death.
More genuinely skeptical are the agnostics and atheists. Agnostics differ from the
spiritual but unaffiliated in that they believe that it is epistemologically impossible to
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have knowledge as to whether supernatural concepts, such as God, exist or not. But by
the same token, while agnosticism does not embrace a belief in God, it also does not
reject the possibility that a God does exist; it simply claims that one cannot know for sure
if either position is true. Atheists, however, differ from both the spiritual but unaffiliated
and the agnostics in that they express a stronger skepticism of religion and religious
claims, rejecting the existence of God and supernatural concepts as altogether
unwarranted ideas (Dawkins, 2006). Many atheists tend to reject religion and its doctrines
on the grounds that religious and spiritual claims do not meet the burden of proof (Russel,
1957). In particular, atheists would argue that there is no valid scientific evidence for the
existence of God, and potentially some evidence that makes the existence of one (or
many) unlikely (e.g., Dawkins, 2006). Given that atheists reject the supernatural claims
made by religion, one important question is whether atheists are able to maintain their
rejection of available religious and supernatural concepts and beliefs when coping with
the awareness of death.
One response to that question takes the form of the popular aphorism, “There are
no atheists in foxholes,” implying that the awareness of death is enough to inspire
religious faith. However, the existence of groups like the Military Association of Atheists
and Freethinkers serves as anecdotal evidence of atheists who face the threat of death
often, as soldiers, yet still maintain their atheism and reject religious faith. Additionally,
qualitative research on atheists on their deathbeds revealed that they typically requested
that hospital staff refrain from bed-side proselytizing and respect their (dis)beliefs (Smith
& Stoner, 2007). These two social examples represent anecdotal evidence that there are
atheists in foxholes.
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But while social examples are insightful and useful, experimental research is still
needed for such questions. There are several studies that have tested MS effects among
the non-religious and have found that MS does not increase their expressed faith
(Norenzayan & Hansen, 2012; Vail et al., 2012; Jong et al 2012). A study by Vail et al.
(2012), that specifically sampled atheists, found that MS did not lead atheists to report
stronger religiosity, faith in a higher power, or faith in any of various supernatural agents.
Other research (Jong et al., 2012) has assessed the impact of MS on non-religious
participants’ implicit associations and explicit religious faith. In two studies, when
participants were asked to categorize various stimuli words as quickly as possible, MS
led non-religious participants to more quickly associate supernatural concepts (e.g.,
heaven, god) with “real” rather than “imaginary,” perhaps indicating an initial implicit
activation of supernatural concepts when made aware of death. However, in a third study,
when participants were asked to explicitly indicate their faith on Likert-type items, at
their own pace, the non-religious participants again continued to explicitly reject religious
faith even after MS. Together, these findings suggest that when atheists are reminded of
death they may initially implicitly activate religious concepts, to reflexively prepare
themselves to express terror-managing faith in supernatural concepts; but, when given
time to reflect on supernatural concepts, over-ride that preparation and ultimately reject
religious/supernatural beliefs given the stance that such supernatural claims do not meet
the logical burdens of proof.
Indeed, recent research suggests that religious concepts, such as supernatural
agency and teleological creation, are developmentally natural intuitions, meaning that the
religious conceptualizations of supernatural agents, immortal souls, and afterlife are
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buttressed by basic, evolutionarily adaptive cognitive inclinations to make intuitive
causal attributions and interpret others’ intentions (theory of mind), make moral
judgments, engage in social learning, and judge the utility or purposes of people and
objects (teleological reasoning), among other tasks (Barrett, 2000, 2004; Bering, 2006,
2010; Bloom, 2007; Boyer, 1994; Guthrie, 1993). As but one example, the evolutionarily
adaptive ability to detect the intentions and desires of others created an “intuitive”
inclination to see agency where there is none, to see “faces in the clouds” (Guthrie, 1993;
Barrett, 2000). Implicit preferences for teleological explanations in both children and
adults have led Kelemen and Rosset (2009) to argue that teleological explanations are
used as a default explanation for many phenomena. Such research can help to explain
why religion comes so naturally to humans, why it is a nearly universal phenomenon, and
perhaps also why even atheists will implicitly activate religious concepts when aware of
death. However, although religious and supernatural tendencies are intuitive, or natural,
this does not mean that such intuitions will inevitably lead atheists to accept the
supernatural concepts or explicit belief.
Recently, Norenzayan & Gervais (2013) have provided data-based arguments
concerning the cognitive and motivational factors by which religious beliefs and concepts
may be accepted. First, atheism can emerge due to a cognitive inability to mentally
comprehend the concept of gods or supernatural agents. Such is the case among people
with autism (Norenzayan, Gervais, & Trzesniewski, 2012) and among young children
(Makris & Pnevmatikos, 2007), both having difficulty representing others’ minds.
Second, atheism may emerge when individuals are not motivated to convert religious
intuitions into explicit belief, such as if a region is marked by relative economic
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prosperity, health, and safety (Zuckerman, 2008). Third, atheism may emerge in regions
characterized by strong secular cultures rather than in cultures shaped by religion. The
fourth factor, engaging in analytic processing, is a much more common—and is by far the
most commonly reported reason for atheism (Silver, 2014). Research on this topic is
consistent with dual-process models of cognitive processing (Chaiken & Trope, 1999;
Evans, 2008, 2010; also, Baumard & Boyer, 2013) which hold that intuitive processing
(System 1) is quick, automatic, and implicit, whereas reflective processing (System 2) is
typically slower, more deliberate, and explicit. For example, rather than relying on
intuitive cognitive processes, which is associated with stronger religious belief, weaker
and less prevalent religious belief occurs among those who engage in more analytic
thinking. While analytic cognitive style helps over-ride cognitive intuitions that lead, for
example, to endorsement of creationism rather than evolution (Gervais, 2015),
experimental evidence shows that activating analytic thinking (e.g., via perceptual
disfluency, or image-based or lexical primes of analytic thinking concepts), presumably
over-riding intuition, decreases religious belief (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012).
Furthermore, experimental conditions that prevent analytic thinking (e.g., highspeed response trials) have been shown to prevent people from engaging in analytical
thinking and over-riding those intuitions—leading even Finns and American atheists to
make cognitively intuitive errors consistent with religious creationist views (Jarnefelt,
Canfield, & Kelemen, 2015). For example, Jarnefelt et al., 2015 presented believers and
non-believers with images of both living and non-living things (e.g., a giraffe, a
mountain) and asked them to judge whether “any being purposefully made the thing in
the picture”, to measure teleological reasoning. When participants answered the questions
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at their own pace, believers gave more teleological answers (the object was made by a
“being”) than did non-believers (the object was not made by a “being”). However, when
speeded, non-believer’s answers were more teleological, resembling those of believers.
This suggests that when speeding restricts non-believer’s ability to engage in reflective
thinking (system 2), forcing them to rely on intuitive processes (system 1), their
responses become similar to that of religious individuals, revealing implicit reliance on
teleological intuitions. This perspective further offers a way to understand why atheists
reminded of death initially implicitly activate religious concepts (Jong et al., 2012), but
maintain their rejection of religion when asked to provide explicit responses on selfreport measures. This analysis leads to the novel theoretical perspective that atheists
maintain their disbelief, even when made aware of death, by cognitively over-riding the
motivation to express religious faith—and, therefore, that conditions that prevent people
from cognitively over-riding religious intuitions would result in reminders of mortality
leading even atheists to increase expressed religious faith.
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CHAPTER II
THE PRESENT RESEARCH
The present research sought out to explore the role that analytic thinking may play
in maintaining atheism in the face of the awareness of death, and further investigate the
question of whether there are atheists in foxholes. The present study sampled atheists and
used a 2 (MS vs control) x 2 (unspeeded vs speeded trials) x 4 (DV items: religious vs.
intuitive but incorrect [teleological] vs. intuitive and correct [yes-bias] vs. non-intuitive
and incorrect [no-bias]) design, explained further immediately below.
First, atheists were recruited based on a premeasure in which respondents
identified their religious persuasion. Second, participants were contacted and recruited to
complete the primary materials. The materials were borrowed methods from previous
research (Vail et al., 2012) to manipulate the awareness of mortality (MS prime vs.
control topic prime). Then, borrowing from both Kelemen et al., (2009) and Vail et al.,
(2012), participants were asked to indicate their agreement with a series of Likert-type
self-report items assessing 1) religious faith, 2) agreement with intuitive but factually
incorrect statements about teleological design, 3) intuitive and factually correct
statements about causation and teleology (designed to bias questions toward agreement; a
“yes”-bias), and 4) non-intuitive and factually incorrect statements about causation and
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teleology (designed to bias questions toward disagreement; a “no”-bias). This measure
was then manipulated according to Kelemen’s method; participants were randomly
assigned to either complete the measure at their leisure (a typical Likert-type self-report;
“unspeeded trials” condition) or under a time pressure (“speeded trials” condition).The
purpose of the time pressure condition was to prevent participants from having the time
to cognitively over-ride their intuitions, whatever those intuitions may be.
The first hypothesis was: a replication of prior research (Kelemen et al., 2009) in
the control condition, such that low agreement with the teleological items should be
found in the un-speeded condition, but that they should increase agreement in the speeded
trials condition—reflecting a reduced ability to logically over-ride intuitive concepts.
The second hypothesis was a simple extension of that prior research, connecting it
directly to religious faith. In the control condition, it was expected that atheists in the unspeeded condition would report low agreement with the religious faith items but increase
expression of faith in the speeded condition—reflecting a reduced ability to analytically
over-ride intuitively appealing, yet logically unwarranted (from an atheistic perspective),
concepts.
The third and focal hypothesis was a full extension, intersecting this prior work
with the motivational factor of death awareness. It was expected that in the un-speeded
condition, MS (vs. control) would have no impact on what is anticipated to be atheists’
rejection of the religious and teleological items—reflecting the idea that, even in the
awareness of death, atheists likely utilize their analytic resources to cognitively over-ride
such otherwise intuitive concepts. However, in the speeded condition, MS (vs. control)
was expected to increase atheists’ agreement with the religious and teleological items—
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reflecting the idea that the awareness of death exert a motivational influence on belief in
intuitive (yet unwarranted) concepts if atheists are unable to wield their analytic resources
to cognitively over-ride such processes. Lastly, we expected to find no effects of MS, or
the MS x Trial Speeding interaction, on the yes-bias or no-bias items.
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CHAPTER III
METHOD
Estimation of Minimum Sample Size
Sample size planning was based on selecting a “minimally important effect size”
threshold (effects below which would be disregarded as trivial). The target analyses
involved one set of religious/supernatural concepts dependent measures (with three
subscales of general, Christian, and Hindu varieties) and one dependent measure on
unjustified teleological statements.
Sample size planning for the first set was based on repeated measure ANOVA
techniques, with an effect size of measuring the effect of a possible MS*Speed
interaction on the three subscale measures of general, Christian, and Hindu
religious/supernatural beliefs. Using an a-priori power analysis for F-family tests for
ANOVA (repeated measures, within-between interaction) (G*Power; Faul, Erdfelder,
Buchner, & Lang, 2009), we selected a minimum effect size threshold of f = .175 (a
small-medium effect), and set power to .80 for detecting effects at p = .05, with 4 groups,
3 measures, and an assumed (but actually unknown) correlation between measures of r =
.50. This analysis recommended a minimum sample size of at least 80 participants.
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Sample size planning for the second dependent measure was based on ANOVA
techniques, with an effect size of measuring the effect of a possible MS*Speed
interaction on agreement with the teleological statements. Using an a-priori power
analysis for F-family tests for ANOVA (fixed effects, special, main effects, and
interactions) (G*Power; Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009), we selected a
minimum effect size threshold of f = .175 (a small-medium effect), and set power to .80
for detecting effects at p = .05, with 1 numerator df and 4 groups. This analysis
recommended a minimum sample size of at least 259 participants.
Recruitment
Due to the difficulty of recruiting sufficient numbers of atheists from the local
population, a research panel company, TurkPrime, was hired to recruit atheist participants
throughout the USA. TurkPrime is an academic research panel recruitment firm, and is a
third-party entity separate from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) crowd-sourced
workforce platform. TurkPrime offers options for interfacing with MTurk’s web-based
workforce platform, but it also offers a number of other targeted recruitment services. An
initial assessment by TurkPrime determined that there were not enough naïve atheists
available via MTurk, so recruitment was instead accomplished through TurkPrime’s
independent PrimePanels recruitment service, which extends beyond MTurk to hundreds
of other web-based platforms to reach up to 20 million respondents globally. The survey
was set-up/coded on Qualtrics, and TurkPrime used PrimePanels to distribute the
Qualtrics link to panel members who had previously indicated being “atheist” on a
demographic item. Data collection took place over roughly two weeks (March 6-22,
2018) at the cost of $4.00 per respondent.
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Participant Characteristics
A total of 497 panel members were initially recruited and completed the informed
consent; 53 respondents either did not provide any data or discontinued the study, and
thus did not respond to the MS manipulation, DVs, and/or complete the demographic
survey (thus not able to confirm their atheist status). Of the remaining 444 participants,
70 reported being something other than atheist (34 “agnostic”, 28 “spiritual”, 3
“Christian”, 1 “Hindu”, 1 “Buddhist”, 1 “Jewish”, and 2 “other”). Of the remaining 374
atheists who completed the study, one skipped the manipulation and one skipped the
dependent variable and were necessarily dropped.
Thus, the final sample consisted of 372 atheists who completed all the key
manipulations and dependent variables. At the end of the survey, participants indicated
age, sex, race, ethnicity, religious affiliation, years of education, and political orientation
(see descriptives in Table 1).
Materials and Procedure
In all cases, the study link was distributed using a neutral title and description
(e.g., “A survey about social attitudes and personality”) to conceal its true purpose and
associated hypotheses. Upon obtaining informed consent, the following materials were
presented.
Cover story, personality measure. To bolster the cover story and acclimate
respondents to the survey format, a six-item version of the personal need for structure
scale (PNS, Thomson et al., 2001) was presented. The PNS scale measures individual
preferences for order, certainty, and unambiguous knowledge. Example items include, “I
enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life” and “I become uncomfortable when the
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rules in a situation are not clear.” Each item used a 6-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly
disagree, 6 = strongly agree). This measure is unrelated to the present hypothesis, and so
will not be further mentioned.
Mortality salience manipulation. Following previous research (Rosenblatt et al.,
1989), participants were randomly assigned to respond to either MS or a negative event
topic prompt. In the MS condition, two prompts asked participants to, “Please briefly
describe the emotions that the thought of your own death arouses in you,” and “Jot down,
as specifically as you can, what you think happens to you as you physically die and once
you are physically dead.” The negative event topic prompts asked participants parallel
questions about public speaking. This comparison topic was chosen to determine whether
MS causes any effects beyond simply being a negative event.
Delay and distraction. Next, the 26-item positive and negative affect schedule
(PANAS, Lambert, Eadeh, Peak, Scherer, Schott, & Slochower, 2014) was administered1,
as well as a brief 3-5 minute reading task (an excerpt taken from Albert Camus’ The
Growing Stone), followed by the self-affirmation manipulation. These materials were
included to provide the delay and task-switching distraction needed to move deathawareness out of focal attention to observe distal terror management effects (see
Pyszczynski, et al., 1999).
Time pressure manipulation. Participants were then randomly assigned to either
a speeded or unspeeded condition. In the unspeeded condition, they were allowed to
respond to each item at their own pace. In the speeded condition, however, they had just
3 seconds to respond to each dependent variable item. All participants were first
presented with a “practice block” of 8 items for the sole purpose of acclimating
1 Interested readers can find supplemental analyses on affect in Appendix B.
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participants to the task. Following the practice block, the task paused, the instructions
were presented again, and then participants completed a “target block” of 40 items that
contained the key dependent measures. In the un-speeded condition, participants were
told they would be able to take their time and think about their response, whereas
participants in the speeded condition were informed that they would only have three
seconds, and since this was a short period of time, they would need to respond as quickly
as they could. See Appendix A for specific instructions, including language about the
time-pressure manipulation, used in each condition.
Target block: dependent measures and checks. A total of 40 items were
included in the target block and were presented in random order for each participant.
Faith in religious/supernatural concepts. The primary target dependent measure
consisted of 12 items which assessed faith in religious/supernatural concepts (a = .92).
Six of these items were domain-general (a = .84); three of those items explicitly evoked
Christian religious/supernatural concepts (a = .87); and the remaining three of those items
explicitly evoked Hindu religious/supernatural concepts (a = .81). An overall mean score
was computed such that higher scores indicated greater faith.
Teleological reasoning. A second target dependent measure similarly consisted of
12 items assessing agreement with intuitive but logically unjustified/incorrect teleological
statements (a = .79). A mean score was computed such that higher scores indicated
greater teleological thinking.
Manipulation checks. One set of items were included to check stimuli processing
ability (accuracy-check) across conditions, and two sets of items were included to check
whether the manipulation successfully impaired System 2 processing. To check stimuli
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processing ability, one set of four accuracy-check items instructed participants to select
“strongly disagree,” “disagree,” “agree,” and “strongly agree,” respectively. To check
whether the manipulation successfully impaired System 2 processing, one set of 6 items
assessed agreement/disagreement with statements that were intuitive and logically correct
( = .75), and another set of 6 items assessed agreement/disagreement with statements
that were counter-intuitive and logically incorrect ( = .84). Item mean scores were used.
Whereas participants in the unspeeded condition should get the benefit of System 1
intuition as well as System 2 style reflective thought, and thus have stronger
agreement/disagreement responses, those in the speeded condition were expected to have
similarly biased—but weaker—responses due to the impairment of additional System 2
processing.
Participants were presented with items religious and teleological items and asked
to indicate their agreement with those items using a 4-point Likert-type response scale (1
= strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = agree, 4 = strongly agree)2, as listed in Table 2.
Once they had selected their agreement with the item, the participants continued to the
next item by pressing a NEXT button presented at the bottom of the screen. In the
speeded condition, if the time ran out before the participants could press next, their
answer was saved, and they were quickly presented with the next item. Timings were also
recorded for all target block items, including time-to-first-click and time-to-itemsubmission. All dependent measure items are included in Appendix A.
2 The Qualtrics multiple-choice item option required that participants click one of four small radio buttons,
which pilot testing revealed to be exceptionally difficult to click/tap quickly in the speeded condition.
Therefore, an image of a 1x4 bordered table showing the four Likert-type response options was created (see
Appendix A); each item was coded in Qualtrics as a “hotspot” item, with the item statement presented
above the image, and with four separate/independent hotspot response fields superimposed over the table
cells so that clicking/tapping a particular table cell would toggle that particular response field’s data entry
to “on” or “off”. After completion of the study, these verbal on/off data were cleaned by converting each
item with a single valid hotspot response into a single 1-4 numeric rating.
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Demographics, religious/philosophical identification. At the end of the survey,
participants completed a demographic questionnaire. The demographics page asked about
age, sex, race, ethnicity, education level, political orientation, and religious/philosophical
identification. Regarding religious identification, response options were: “Christian”;
“Muslim”; “Jewish”; “Buddhist”; “Hindu”; “Spiritual”; “Agnostic”; “Atheist” and
“other.” Data from atheist respondents were retained for analysis.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
Preliminary Analyses
Response Speed. To measure and compare the speed-of-processing for each of
the four target measures, time-to-first-click and time-to-item-submission were recorded
and are analyzed below in seconds.
Time to first click. A 2 (MS vs. pain) x 2 (unspeeded vs speeded) x 3 (repeated
measures: general religious/supernatural vs Christian supernatural vs Hindu supernatural
vs teleological) mixed-model ANOVA found no main effect of measure (F(3, 1104) =
.86, p2 = .002, p = .46), and no MS*measure interaction (F(3, 1104) = .51, p2 = .001, p
= .67) nor Speed*measure interaction (F(3, 1104) = .79, p2 = .002, p = .50) nor threeway interaction (F(3, 1104) = .53, p2 = .001, p = .66), suggesting that any possible
effects of the manipulations on time-to-first-click did not differ across the measures of
faith in general, Christian, and Hindu supernatural concepts, and teleological statements.
Also, there was no main effect of MS (F(1, 368) = 1.66, p2 = .004, p = .20) nor an
MS*Speed interaction, F(1, 368) = 1.78, p2 = .005, p = .18. However, there did emerge
the expected main effect of speed condition (F(1, 368) = 11.18, p2 = .03, p = .001), such
that time-to-first-click was faster in the speeded condition (M = 1.45, SD = .27) compared
to the un-speeded condition (M = 4.31, SD = 11.66).
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Time to item submission. A 2 (MS vs. pain) x 2 (unspeeded vs speeded) x 3
(repeated measures: general religious/supernatural vs Christian supernatural vs Hindu
supernatural vs teleological) mixed-model ANOVA found no main effect of measure
(F(3, 1104) = 1.07, p2 = .003, p = .36), and no MS*measure interaction (F(3, 1104) =
.66, p2 = .002, p = .58) nor Speed*measure interaction (F(3, 1104) = .84, p2 = .002, p =
.47) nor three-way interaction (F(3, 1104) = .65, p2 = .002, p = .58), suggesting that any
possible effects of the manipulations on time-to-item-submission did not differ across the
measures of faith in general, Christian, and Hindu supernatural concepts, and teleological
statements. Also, there was no main effect of MS (F(1, 368) = 1.43, p2 = .004, p = .23)
nor an MS*Speed interaction, F(1, 368) = 1.53, p2 = .004, p = .22. However, there did
emerge the expected main effect of speed condition (F(1, 368) = 11.15, p2 = .03, p =
.001), such that time-to-first-click was faster in the speeded condition (M = 2.61, SD =
.39) compared to the un-speeded condition (M = 5.52, SD = 11.87).
Stimuli processing ability. Given that some participants were responding
quickly, we also checked whether participants were indeed able to read the items under
each speed condition, by inspecting the overall accuracy rates across the four accuracycheck items embedded at random in the target block. Item 1 instructed a “strongly
disagree” response; item 2 “disagree”; item 3 “agree”; and item 4 “strongly agree.” These
items were not used as exclusion criteria, nor as covariates, because it was anticipated
that the speeded condition would be demanding and therefore suppress response rates but
also that response rates would be orthogonal to comprehension. Indeed, in the unspeeded
condition, participants (n = 191) faced 764 accuracy-check items and only had 4 missed
responses for a non-response rate of .005%; whereas in the speeded condition,
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participants (n = 181) faced a total of 724 accuracy-check items and had 133 missed
responses for a non-response rate of 18.37%. However, the accuracy rates were high in
both conditions. In the unspeeded condition, of the 760 responses given, a total of 748
(98.42%) were able to accurately follow the item instructions; whereas in the speeded
condition, of the 591 responses given, a total of 548 (92.72%) were able to comprehend
the items and accurately follow the item instructions. These findings indicate that
participants in both conditions were indeed able to read and comprehend the check items
with high accuracy.
System 2 processing manipulation check. Next, we checked whether the speed
manipulation had the desired effect of manipulating participants’ ability to use System 2
processing to reflectively regulate their responses on items with a clearly
correct/incorrect answer. First, we analyzed agreement/disagreement with 6 items that
were intuitive and logically correct ( = .75); System 1 should produce an intuitive
agreement bias, and System 2 should solidify that agreement further via reflective
thought. Second, we analyzed agreement/disagreement with 6 items that were counterintuitive and logically incorrect ( = .84); System 1 should produce an intuitive
disagreement bias, and System 2 should solidify that disagreement further via reflective
thought. Thus, if the time pressure in the speeded condition impairs System 2 processing,
then agreement/disagreement should be less extreme than in the unspeeded condition
where participants would get the benefit of System 1 intuition as well as System 2 style
reflective thought.
Intuitive and logically justified/correct items. A 2 (MS vs. pain) x 2 (unspeeded vs
speeded) ANOVA revealed no main effect of MS (F(1, 368) = 2.05, p2 = .006, p = .15),
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nor a two-way interaction, F(1, 368) = .34, p2 = .001, p = .56. However, there did
emerge a significant main effect of speed condition, F(1, 368) = 8.92, p2 = .02, p = .003,
such that agreement with these statements was higher in the unspeeded condition (M =
3.56, SD = .37) compared to the speeded condition (M = 3.43, SD = .52), indicating that
the ability to use System 2 reflective thought was impaired in the speeded condition.
Counter-intuitive and logically unjustified/incorrect items. A 2 (MS vs. pain) x 2
(unspeeded vs speeded) ANOVA revealed no main effect of MS (F(1, 366) = .81, p2 =
.002, p = .37) nor two-way interaction, F(1, 366) = .005, p2 < .001, p = .94. However,
there did emerge a significant main effect of speed condition, F(1, 366) = 39.74, p2 =
.10, p < .001 such that rejection of the logical-no statements was stronger in the
unspeeded condition (M = 1.14, SD = .31) compared to the speeded condition (M = 1.44,
SD = .59), indicating that the ability to use System 2 reflective thought was impaired in
the speeded condition.
Summary. Together, these preliminary findings indicate that participants in the
speeded (vs unspeeded) condition were effectively pressured to respond quickly, and that
although they were still able to read and comprehend the items accurately under time
pressure, the time pressure successfully impaired their System 2 style reflective ability.
Target Analyses
Descriptive statistics for the target analyses, by condition, are listed in Table 3.
Faith in religious/supernatural concepts. A 2 (MS vs. pain) x 2 (unspeeded vs
speeded) x 3 (repeated measures of faith in supernatural concepts: general vs Christian vs
Hindu) mixed-model ANOVA revealed a main effect of measure (F(2, 736) = 46.24, p2
= .11, p < .001), such that atheists rejected Christian supernatural concepts (M = 1.22, SD
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= .44) more strongly than Hindu supernatural concepts (M = 1.27, SD = .45) which were
also rejected more strongly than general supernatural concepts (M = 1.41, SD = .51) (all
t(370)s > 2.94, p < .003). However, there was no MS*measure interaction (F(2, 736) =
.96, p2 = .003, p = .37) nor Speed*measure interaction (F(2, 736) = 1.73, p2 = .005, p =
.18) nor three-way interaction (F(2, 736) = 2.17, p2 = .006, p = .12), suggesting that any
possible effects of the manipulations did not differ across the measures of faith in
general, Christian, and Hindu supernatural concepts3.
Also, there was no main effect of MS (F(1, 368) = .67, p2 = .002, p = .41) nor a
main effect of speed condition (F(1, 368) = .80, p2 = .002, p = .80). However, there did
emerge the predicted MS*Speed interaction, F(1, 368) = 5.91, p2 = .01, p = .02 (see
Figure 1). In the unspeeded condition, rejection of faith in supernatural/religious
concepts was significantly stronger in the MS condition than the public speaking
condition (t[189] = -2.34, d = -.35, 95%CI [-.64, -.06], p = .02). However, in the speeded
condition, rejection of faith in supernatural/religious concepts was non-significantly
reduced in the MS condition compared to the public speaking condition (t[179] = 1.13, d
= .17, 95%CI [-.12, .46], p = .26).
Intuitive but logically unjustified/incorrect teleological statements. A 2 (MS
vs. pain) x 2 (unspeeded vs speeded) ANOVA revealed no main effect of MS (F(1, 368)
= 1.74, p2 = .005, p = .19), although there did emerge a significant main effect of speed
condition, F(1, 368) = 11.60, p2 = .03, p = .001, such that agreement with the intuitive
but unjustified/incorrect teleological statements was higher in the speeded condition (M =
3.14, SD = .47) compared to the unspeeded condition (M = 2.96, SD = .49). There was no
3 Interested readers can find supplemental analyses and figures for the three separate subscales in Appendix
B.
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significant 2-way interaction, F(1, 368) = .28, p2 = .001, p = .60 (Figure 2). In the
unspeeded condition, agreement with the unjustified teleological statements was nonsignificantly stronger in the MS condition than the public speaking condition (t[189] =
1.33, d = .18, 95%CI [-.10, .47], p = .19). However, in the speeded condition, there was
no difference in agreement with the unjustified teleological statements in the MS
condition compared to the public speaking condition (t[179] = .56, d = .11, 95%CI [-.19,
.40], p = .58).
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
First, I hypothesized that atheists in the un-speeded conditions would report low
agreement with the teleological items, but that they would increase agreement in the
speeded trials condition. This hypothesis was supported by the data; results revealed a
significant main effect of the speed condition, indicating that agreement with the intuitive
but unjustified/incorrect teleological statements was higher in the speeded condition
compared to the un-speeded condition. Second, I hypothesized that atheists in the unspeeded conditions should similarly report low agreement with religious items, but that
they should increase agreement in the speeded trials condition. This hypothesis was
unsupported by the data; there was no Speed main effect nor Speed*measure interaction,
indicating that religious faith was not generally impacted by the speed manipulation.
Third, we hypothesized that in the un-speeded condition, MS (vs. control) would have no
impact on atheists’ rejection of the religious and teleological items, whereas in the
speeded condition MS (vs. control) would increase atheists’ agreement with the religious
and teleological items. This hypothesis received mixed support. MS led to increased
rejection of faith in supernatural/religious concepts in the unspeeded condition, but not
the speeded condition. Additionally, whereas there was a main effect of speed on
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teleological reasoning, there was no main effect or interaction involving MS.
Implications are as follows.
Data In Context: Interpretations, Implications, and Future Directions
First, the present work converges with prior research on the dual process model of
cognition, suggesting that system 1 thinking is based on automatic/intuitive processing
while system 2 thinking is more analytical (Evans, 2003; Evans, 2008; Morewedge &
Kahneman, 2010). Previous work has found that intuitive processing can lead to the
perception of teleological relationships between intuitively related objects, even when
such inferences are illogical. For example, Finns and atheists in speeded conditions
(restricting to System 1 processing) report higher teleological thinking compared to unspeeded conditions (allowing System 2 processing; Kelemen and Rosset, 2009; Jarnefelt,
Canfield, & Kelemen, 2015). The present research replicated those findings; atheists
increased their agreement with logically unjustified but intuitive teleological statements
when in a speeded condition compared to an un-speeded condition.
Second, the present results were inconsistent with the idea that this teleological
intuition is processed similarly to religious faith. That was an idea suggested by research
on the cognitive science of religion (Barrett, 2000, 2004; Bering, 2006, 2010; Bloom,
2007; Boyer, 1994; Guthrie, 1993), in addition to research suggesting that atheism and
analytical thinking are related (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012). However, the results
suggest that there was no increased agreement with religious items among atheists in the
speeded condition compared to atheists in the un-speeded condition. This finding also
perhaps diverges from previous work by Jarnefelt (2015) which suggested that atheists
were more likely to increase their agreement with “creationist” items and explanations
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when in a speeded compared to an unspeeded condition. This indicates that despite the
fact that atheists may be more likely to endorse certain forms of teleological thinking
when speeded and relying on system 1 processes (Kelemen and Rosset, 2009), they
generally remained reluctant to endorse religious concepts when relying on their
intuition. This raises potential questions for future research about the nature of atheists’
vigilance about general teleological errors compared to specifically religious concepts.
One possibility is that both teleological and religious concepts may indeed seem intuitive
to atheists, but atheists may not be particularly “on guard” for mundane teleological
statements (e.g., about the sun existing to sustain flowers) because they may not have
previously decided to reject those ideas; in contrast, atheists may be more strongly
vigilant about religious concepts because such concepts sit at odds with their expressed
beliefs about the world. Another possibility is that atheists’ particular belief systems or
explicit logical deductions may have influenced their cognitive associations such that
supernatural concepts no longer seem intuitive to them, in which case even a speeded
condition would not have the effect of increasing religious faith per se.
Third, the present research also partially converges with prior research examining
the effects of MS on atheists’ possible religious beliefs. Previous research concerning
these issues has provided different insights into atheist’s religious beliefs when
confronted with existential threat. In terms of explicit religiosity, Vail (2012) found that
atheists made aware of their mortality maintain their explicit atheism, whereas Jong
(2012) found that atheists increase their explicit atheism. Our data is more consistent
with Jong’s findings; in the unspeeded condition, MS led atheists to demonstrate an
increased rejection of religious concepts. These findings add support to the worldview
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defense hypothesis (Ardnt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Simon, 1997),
suggesting that when made aware of their mortality, atheists will more strongly affirm
their support for their non-religious worldview. Additionally, prior research (Jong et al.,
2012) has also measured the effect of MS on religiosity when restricted to System 1
processing, by using an implicit association test (IAT) of activation of religious
concepts—finding that MS led atheists to more strongly associate religious concepts as
“real” (vs imaginary). However, in the speeded condition, which also presumably
restricted to System 1 processing, MS did not lead to stronger expressions of religious
faith. There was a pattern in the predicted direction, such that in the speeded condition
MS tended to increase religiosity, but that directional trend was not strong enough to
reach statistical significance in this well-powered study. It is not immediately clear
whether methodological differences can possibly account for the difference between
these and the prior results. However, it is worth noting that the Jong studies recruited
participants who scored low on a religiosity scale (and were thus thought to be “nonreligious”), whereas the present research recruited participants who were confirmed
atheists; perhaps those samples represent meaningfully different populations.
Fourth, the present work diverges from prior research finding that MS increased
teleological beliefs (Davis, Juhl, & Routledge, 2010), suggesting that teleological beliefs
(the notion that events, actions, or the world have intentional causes with a purpose) help
assuage the potential anxiety that can arise from the awareness of mortality. As above,
the present work found a directional trend such that MS tended to increase agreement
with teleological statements, but that trend was not strong enough to reach statistical
significance. The current and prior work used similar methods; but again, it is worth
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noting differences in the recruited samples; the prior work recruited a general sample,
whereas the present work recruited confirmed atheists. It is not immediately apparent
whether or why that difference should moderate the effect, but future research could
investigate whether it does and—if so—further investigate possible mechanisms.
Limitations
One of the possible limitations of the present research is the inability to monitor
the participants in a controlled lab setting given the online nature of the study. The online
setting, which was necessary to attain a sufficient number of atheist participants, leaves
the researcher incapable of physically ensuring that accurate attention is being paid to the
studies procedures throughout the duration of the experiment, although the present
research methods did have certain attention check items in place that were designed to
offset this potential problem and did indeed appear to verify sufficient attention
throughout.
Another potential limitation of this study is that there may be methodological
complications surrounding atheist’s ability to recognize the religious content of religious
items and tendency to associate them as false. In this case, speeding participants may be
too crude of a way to measure atheists intuitive system 1 responses. While three seconds
has been fast enough to lower atheist’s inhibitions about teleological items (Jarnefelt,
2015), as mentioned previously, atheists may be more on guard for religious items and
therefore may be quick enough to subvert any possible intuitive appeal. Previous research
(Jong, et al 2012) has utilized implicit associations (IAT) to measure atheist’s implicit
responses toward religious concepts. Furthermore, rather than inhibiting participants
ability to engage system 2 cognition by speeding them, an alternative method to deplete
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system 2 cognition and measure system 1 cognition could be to implement a cognitive
load (have participants keep an eight-digit number in their working memory therefore
depleting their cognitive resources). This alternative was not available for the present
study given its online nature, where participants could not be directly monitored to ensure
they did not cheat during this method (writing the number down as opposed to holding it
in their working memory). These alternative methods may play a useful role in future
research.
Additionally, in terms of demographics, it worth mentioning that our sample of
participants were also older than most participants in most of the previous literature. Due
to the fact that our study was completed online and sampled atheists from across the
country, the median age of our sample (38.38) is older than previous samples of
participants due to their recruitment of undergraduate psychology students. Future
research may take into consideration the role that age may play in existential threat and
religious beliefs.
Another area that future research could address is the role that one’s religious
history may play in these circumstances. Although we did not assess the religious history
of participants, atheists who were raised religious may be more likely to intuitively
activate religious concepts given their past socialization or due to a reversion back to
their prior defenses, than atheists who were raised in a more secular
environment/household and have never been strongly exposed to religious doctrines. This
kind of exploration in future research may bring to light individual factors in atheist’s
lives concerning this complex question.

35

Conclusion
The atheist in the proverbial foxhole has served as a topic of discussion in
conversations concerning religious convictions, decision making, and existential threat.
In the case of Albert Camus novel, the atheist Meursault maintains his atheism even
though his demise is near. The present research suggests, consistent with Meursault’s
decision and previous anecdotal evidence, that even when made aware of mortality
atheists will stand steadfast in their convictions, maintaining their atheism despite their
existential dilemma. While some have argued that atheists will ultimately succumb to the
appeal of the afterlife and or a sympathetic God, others have argued that atheists will
stand steadfast in their disbelief. While the anecdotal evidence of atheists on their
deathbed and in combat have made it clear that atheists are capable of standing by their
convictions in the face of death, empirical evidence has generally provided a more mixed
answer, suggesting that atheists managing death awareness may maintain or even
increase their disbelief when able to draw upon their beliefs (Jong et al 2012, Vail et al,
2012), but perhaps not when pressed to rely on their intuitions (Kelemen & Rosset 2009,
Jarnefelt, 2015). However, the present work raises questions about whether even that
picture may be more complicated and tentative than it might seem.
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Appendix A
[Personality/filler items]
PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT
Please read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree with
each according to your experience. It is important for you to know that there are no
"right" or "wrong" answers to these questions. People are different, and we are
interested in your experience.
1
Strongly Disagree

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

2

3

4

5

6

Strongly Agree

It upsets me to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect from it.
I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life.
I like to have a place for everything and everything in its place.
I don’t like situations that are uncertain.
I find that a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more.
I become uncomfortable when the rules in a situation are not clear.
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Appendix B
[MANIPULATION #1: MORTALITY SALIENCE CONDITION]
The Projective Life Attitudes Assessment
1. PLEASE BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THE EMOTIONS THAT THE THOUGHT OF
YOUR OWN DEATH AROUSES IN YOU.
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
2. JOT DOWN, AS SPECIFICALLY AS YOU CAN, WHAT YOU THINK HAPPENS
TO YOU AS YOU PHYSICALLY DIE AND ONCE YOU ARE PHYSICALLY DEAD.
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
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[MANIPULATION #1: PUBLIC SPEAKING CONDITION]
The Projective Life Attitudes Assessment
1. PLEASE BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THE EMOTIONS THAT THE THOUGHT OF
PUBLIC SPEAKING AROUSES IN YOU.
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
2. JOT DOWN, AS SPECIFICALLY AS YOU CAN, WHAT YOU THINK
PHYSICALLY WILL HAPPEN TO YOU AS YOU PHYSICALLY EXPERIENCE
PUBLIC SPEAKING.
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
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Appendix C
PANAS [REVISED; LAMBERT ET AL., 2014]
This scale consists of a number of words and phrases that describe different feelings and
emotions. Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that
word. Indicate to what extent you feel this way RIGHT NOW.
1

2

3

4

5

Strongly Disagree

6

Strongly Agree

1. ____ afraid

10. ____ distressed

19. ____ serene

2. ____ comforted

11. ____ insecure

20. ____ sad

3. ____ nervous

12. ____ soothed

21. ____ worried

4. ____ happy

13. ____ irate

22. ____ dejected

5. ____ anxious

14. ____ scared

23. ____ calm

6. ____ at-ease

15. ____ satisfied

24. ____ relaxed

7. ____ unsure

16. ____ fearful

25. ____ frightened

8. ____ irritable

17. ____ mad

26. ____ uncertain

9. ____ tranquil

18. ____ angry
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Appendix D
[MANIPULATION #2: SPEEDED CONDITION]
[Instructions for the PRACTICE BLOCK:]
In the next task, you will be presented with a series of 8 statements, presented one at a
time, and asked to indicate whether you agree or disagree. For example:
Chocolate is a delicious treat.

In this example, you would click/tap the appropriate box, and then click/tap "Next" to
record your response and proceed to the next item.
However, each item will be presented for only 3 seconds. This is a VERY short
period of time, and means you will need to read the item and respond as quickly as
you possibly can.
When you're ready, please press "Next" to begin.
[The following practice block items were presented in random order, using qualtrics
survey flow randomizing feature.]
1. Ferns grow in forests in order to provide ground shade
2. Trees produce oxygen so that animals can breathe
3. The sun radiates heat in order to nurture life
4. Rocks are sometimes jagged so that animals don’t sit on them
5. Water freezes when the temperature drops
6. Stoplights change color in order to control traffic
7. Polar bears are white because the sun bleaches them
8. Animals grow ears in order to smell things
[Instructions for the TARGET BLOCK:]
Now that you have had some practice, we will do a main target task of 40 items.
As a reminder, you will be presented with a series of statements, presented one at a time,
and asked to indicate whether you agree or disagree. For example:
Chocolate is a delicious treat.

In this example, you would click/tap the appropriate box, and then click/tap "Next" to
record your response and proceed to the next item.

47

However, each item will be presented for only 3 seconds. This is a VERY short
period of time, and means you will need to read the item and respond as quickly as
you possibly can.
When you're ready, please press "Next" to begin.
[The following 40 target block items were presented in random order, using qualtrics
survey flow randomizing feature.]
Item type
Item
Faith in religious/supernatural concepts
General religious/
1. Religious beliefs are basically correct
supernatural concepts 2. There is a higher power in the world
3. People have immortal souls
4. Supernatural beings exist (e.g., God, angels)
5. An afterlife exists (e.g., Heaven)
6. When I die my soul will live on
Christian supernatural 7. The Christian God is real.
concepts
8. The Christian God answers prayers.
9. The Christian God sometimes intervenes in the world
Hindu supernatural
10. The Hindu gods are real
concepts
11. The Hindu gods answer prayers
12. The Hindu gods sometimes intervene in the world
Intuitive but logically unjustified/incorrect teleological items
13. Finches diversified in order to survive
14. Germs mutate to become drug resistant
15. Parasites multiply to infect the host
16. Earthworms tunnel underground to aerate the soil
17. Mites live on skin in order to consume skin cells
18. Moss forms around rocks to help stop soil erosion
19. Earthquakes happen because tectonic plates must realign
20. Geysers blow in order to discharge underground heat
21. The earth has an ozone layer to protect it from UV light
22. The sun makes light so that plants can photosynthesize
23. Water condenses to moisten the air
24. Molecules fuse in order to create matter
Intuitive and logically justified/correct items
25. Flowers wilt because they get dehydrated
26. Bread rises because it contains yeast
27. People get the flu because they catch a virus
28. Children wear gloves to keep their hands warm
29. Teapots whistle to signal the water is boiling
30. People buy vacuums because they suck up dirt
Counter-intuitive and logically unjustified/incorrect items
31. Zebras have black stripes because they eat coal
32. Gusts of wind occur because animals exhale together
33. Clouds form because bits of cotton collect together
34. Cars have horns to illuminate dark roads
35. Eyelashes exist so that people can wear mascara
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36. Mothers kiss babies in order to scare them

Accuracy checks
37.
38.
39.
40.

On this item please hit strongly disagree and hit next
On this item please hit disagree and hit next
On this item please hit agree and hit next
On this item please hit strongly agree and hit next
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Appendix E
[MANIPULATION #2: UNSPEEDED CONDITION]
[Instructions for the PRACTICE BLOCK:]
In the next task, you will be presented with a series of 8 statements, presented one at a
time, and asked to indicate whether you agree or disagree. For example:
Chocolate is a delicious treat.

In this example, you would click/tap the appropriate box, and then click/tap "Next" to
record your response and proceed to the next item.
Each item will remain on the screen until you respond. This allows you to take your time,
and means you may take your time to think about your responses.
When you're ready, please press "Next" to begin.
[The practice block items described above were presented in random order, using
qualtrics survey flow randomizing feature.]
[Instructions for the TARGET BLOCK:]
Now that you have had some practice, we will do a main target task of 40 items.
As a reminder, you will be presented with a series of statements, presented one at a time,
and asked to indicate whether you agree or disagree. For example:
Chocolate is a delicious treat.

In this example, you would click/tap the appropriate box, and then click/tap "Next" to
record your response and proceed to the next item.
Each item will remain on the screen until you respond. This allows you to take your time,
and means you may take your time to think about your responses.
When you're ready, please press "Next" to begin.
[The 40 target block items described above were presented in random order, using
qualtrics survey flow randomizing feature.]
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1.) What is your age? _____

Appendix F
Demographic
2.) What is your sex? _____Male

_____Female

3.) Is English your native language?
4.) What is your ethnicity? _____Hispanic or Latino _____Not Hispanic or Latino
5.) What is your race? (check only one)
_____1. Caucasian
_____2. African American
_____3. American Indian/Native Alaskan

_____4. Asian/Pacific Islander
_____5. Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander
_____6. Other (specify): ____________

6.) How many years of education have you completed? __________
(e.g., if completed through sophomore year of high school, enter 10; if graduated from
high school, enter 12; if four years of college, enter 16; and so on)
7.) Please rate your political orientation:
1
2
3
4
5
Progressive

Moderate

6
Conservative

8.) How strongly do you identify with your political orientation, indicated in #5 above?
1
2
3
4
5
6
Very Important

Moderate

Not at all important

9.) With which political party do you most strongly identify? (circle one)
Democratic party
Green party
Constitution party
Republican party
Libertarian party
Other: ________
10.) How strongly do you identify with the political party indicated in #7 above? (circle
one)
1
2
3
4
5
6
Very Important

Moderate

Not at all important

11.) Please indicate your religious affiliation, if any (please circle one):
1. Christian
6. Atheist (I do not believe supernatural beings exist)
2. Muslim
7. Spiritual (I believe supernatural beings exist, but I do not
3. Jewish
follow a specific religion)
4. Buddhist
8. Agnostic (I’m not sure whether, or it is not possible to know
5. Hindu
whether, supernatural beings do or do not exist)
9. Other: __________________________
12.) Please indicate the strength of your religious/philosophical belief:
1
2
3
4
5
Very strong strong

moderate weak very weak

What do you think this study is about? ________________________________________
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What thoughts/feelings do you have about this study? ____________________________
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Appendix G: Supplemental analyses
Supplemental analyses of target measure components
General supernatural concepts. A 2 (MS vs. pain) x 2 (unspeeded vs speeded)
ANOVA revealed no main effect of MS (F(1, 368) = .76, p2 = .002, p = .38) nor a main
effect of speed condition (F(1, 368) = .006, p2 < .001, p = .94). However, there did
emerge the 2-way interaction, F(1, 368) = 7.33, p2 = .02, p = .007 (see Figure S1). In the
unspeeded condition, rejection of general supernatural concepts was significantly
stronger in the MS condition than the public speaking condition (t[189] = -2.57, d = -.38,
95%CI [-.67, -.09], p = .01). However, in the speeded condition, rejection of general
supernatural concepts was non-significantly reduced in the MS condition compared to the
public speaking condition (t[179] = 1.27, d = .15, 95%CI [-.12, .46], p = .20).
Christian supernatural concepts. A 2 (MS vs. pain) x 2 (unspeeded vs speeded)
ANOVA revealed no main effect of MS (F(1, 368) = 1.49, p2 = .004, p = .22) nor a main
effect of speed condition (F(1, 368) = 1.12, p2 = .003, p = .29), nor the 2-way
interaction, F(1, 368) = 1.64, p2 = .004, p = .20 (see Figure S2). In the unspeeded
condition, rejection of Christian supernatural concepts was non-significantly stronger in
the MS condition than the public speaking condition (t[189] = -1.80, d = -.27, 95%CI [.55, .02], p = .07). However, in the speeded condition, there was no difference in
rejection of Christian supernatural concepts in the MS condition compared to the public
speaking condition (t[179] = .05, d = .00, 95%CI [-.29, .29], p = .97).
Hindu supernatural concepts. A 2 (MS vs. pain) x 2 (unspeeded vs speeded)
ANOVA revealed no main effect of MS (F(1, 368) = .002, p2 < .001, p = .97) nor a main
effect of speed condition (F(1, 368) = 2.22, p2 = .006, p = .14). However, there did
emerge the 2-way interaction, F(1, 368) = 5.35, p2 = .01, p = .02 (see Figure S3). In the
unspeeded condition, rejection of Hindu supernatural concepts was non-significantly
stronger in the MS condition than the public speaking condition (t[189] = -1.69, d = -.39,
95%CI [-.68, -.10], p = .09). However, in the speeded condition, rejection of Hindu
supernatural concepts was non-significantly reduced in the MS condition compared to the
public speaking condition (t[179] = 1.58, d = .09, 95%CI [-.20, .38], p = .115).
Supplemental analyses of affect
The PANAS-L features Lambert et al.’s (2014) recommended measures of fear (
= .92) and anxiety ( = .86). Because the measure was presented after the MS
manipulation and prior to the speed manipulation, a 2 (MS vs pain) group MANOVA
was conducted, which revealed no effect on anxiety (F(1, 370) = 1.99, p2 = .005, p =
.16) but did reveal an effect on fear (F(1, 370) = 5.69, p2 = .02, p = .02), such that fear
was actually lower in the MS condition (M = 4.59, SD = 1.28) than in the public speaking
condition (M = 4.89, SD = 1.19). These findings are inconsistent with Lambert and
colleagues’ (2014) suggestion that MS causes increased anxiety and fear affect, but is
instead consistent with the vast majority of previous TMT research showing that MS does
not influence explicit anxiety.
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Appendix H: Tables
Table I: Target block and dependent measure items
Table I. Target block and dependent measure items
Item type
Item
Faith in religious/supernatural concepts
General religious/
41. Religious beliefs are basically correct
supernatural concepts 42. There is a higher power in the world
43. People have immortal souls
44. Supernatural beings exist (e.g., God, angels)
45. An afterlife exists (e.g., Heaven)
46. When I die my soul will live on
Christian supernatural 47. The Christian God is real.
concepts
48. The Christian God answers prayers.
49. The Christian God sometimes intervenes in the world
Hindu supernatural
50. The Hindu gods are real
concepts
51. The Hindu gods answer prayers
52. The Hindu gods sometimes intervene in the world
Intuitive but logically unjustified/incorrect teleological items
53. Finches diversified in order to survive
54. Germs mutate to become drug resistant
55. Parasites multiply to infect the host
56. Earthworms tunnel underground to aerate the soil
57. Mites live on skin in order to consume skin cells
58. Moss forms around rocks to help stop soil erosion
59. Earthquakes happen because tectonic plates must realign
60. Geysers blow in order to discharge underground heat
61. The earth has an ozone layer to protect it from UV light
62. The sun makes light so that plants can photosynthesize
63. Water condenses to moisten the air
64. Molecules fuse in order to create matter
Intuitive and logically justified/correct items
65. Flowers wilt because they get dehydrated
66. Bread rises because it contains yeast
67. People get the flu because they catch a virus
68. Children wear gloves to keep their hands warm
69. Teapots whistle to signal the water is boiling
70. People buy vacuums because they suck up dirt
Counter-intuitive and logically unjustified/incorrect items
71. Zebras have black stripes because they eat coal
72. Gusts of wind occur because animals exhale together
73. Clouds form because bits of cotton collect together
74. Cars have horns to illuminate dark roads
75. Eyelashes exist so that people can wear mascara
76. Mothers kiss babies in order to scare them
Accuracy checks
77. On this item please hit strongly disagree and hit next
78. On this item please hit disagree and hit next
79. On this item please hit agree and hit next
80. On this item please hit strongly agree and hit next
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Table II: Item endorsement descriptive statistics
Table II. Item endorsement descriptive statistics, by condition.
Unspeeded

Speeded

M

SD

n

M

SD

n

Mortality salience

1.21

.35

92

1.35

.44

98

Public speaking salience

1.35

.44

99

1.28

.38

83

Mortality salience

3.01

.46

92

3.16

.54

98

Public speaking salience

2.92

.52

99

3.11

.38

83

1. Faith in supernatural/religious concepts

2. Intuitive but unjustified teleology
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Table III. Item endorsement descriptive statistics, by condition.
Unspeeded

Speeded

M

SD

n

M

SD

n

Mortality salience

1.31

.46

92

1.45

.57

98

Public speaking salience

1.50

.53

99

1.36

.46

83

Mortality salience

1.13

.36

92

1.24

.44

98

Public speaking salience

1.25

.51

99

1.24

.43

83

Mortality salience

1.18

.39

92

1.36

.52

98

Public speaking salience

1.29

.46

99

1.25

.40

83

1. General supernatural concepts

2. Christian supernatural concepts

3. Hindu supernatural concepts
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Appendix I: Figures

Faith in supernatural/religious
concepts

2

1.75
Public
speaking
MS

1.5

1.25

1
Unspeeded

Speeded

Figure 1. In the unspeeded condition, atheists’ rejection of faith in supernatural/religious
concepts was stronger in the MS condition than the public speaking condition. In the
speeded condition, atheists’ rejection of faith in supernatural/religious concepts was not
statistically different in the MS condition than the public speaking condition.
Note. Agreement was measured on a 4-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree, 4 =
strongly agree).
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Unjustified teleological statements

3.5

3.25
Public
speaking
MS

3

2.75

2.5
Unspeeded

Speeded

Figure 2. Atheists’ agreement with unjustified teleological statements was stronger in the
speeded (vs unspeeded) condition, regardless of MS manipulation condition.
Note. Agreement was measured on a 4-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree, 4 =
strongly agree).

58

General religious/supernatural
concepts

2

1.75
Public
speaking
MS

1.5

1.25

1
Unspeeded

Speeded

Figure 3. In the unspeeded condition, atheists’ rejection of general religious/supernatural
concepts was stronger in the MS condition than the public speaking condition. In the
speeded condition, atheists’ rejection of general religious/supernatural concepts was not
statistically different in the MS condition than the public speaking condition.
Note. Agreement was measured on a 4-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree, 4 =
strongly agree).
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Christian supernatural concepts

2

1.75
Public
speaking
MS

1.5

1.25

1
Unspeeded

Speeded

Figure 4. In the unspeeded condition, atheists’ rejection of Christian supernatural
concepts was (non-significantly) stronger in the MS condition than the public speaking
condition. In the speeded condition, atheists’ rejection of Christian supernatural concepts
was not statistically different in the MS condition than the public speaking condition.
Note. Agreement was measured on a 4-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree, 4 =
strongly agree).
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Hindu supernatural concepts

2

1.75
Public
speaking
MS

1.5

1.25

1
Unspeeded

Speeded

Figure 5. In the unspeeded condition, atheists’ rejection of Hindu supernatural concepts
was stronger in the MS condition than the public speaking condition. In the speeded
condition, atheists’ rejection of religiosity was not statistically different in the MS
condition than the public speaking condition.
Note. Agreement was measured on a 4-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree, 4 =
strongly agree).
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